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PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS
[Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local Union 204,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 834 F.2d 1424
(8th Cir. 1987)]
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court rulings in the Steelworkers
Trilogyt nearly thirty years ago, a strong national policy favoring the
arbitration of labor disputes has emerged.2 In the Trilogy, the Court
defined the nature of the collective bargaining agreement and the
arbitrator's role in interpreting it.3 In the first case, United Steelwork-
ers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., the Court ruled that a
court may not determine the merits of a grievance when the parties
have agreed to submit the grievance to arbitration.4 In the second
Trilogy case, United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., the Court ruled that there is a presumption of arbitrability in any
collective bargaining agreement that has an arbitration clause.
5
While the first two Trilogy cases dealt with enforcement of an agree-
ment to arbitrate, the third, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
1. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg.- Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATiON WoRKts (4th ed. 1985);
Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and
Around, 52 Mo. L. REV. 243 (1987); W. GouL, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW
136 (2d ed. 1986); Kaden,Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope ofJudicial Re-
view, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1980); Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557 (1983); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1137 (1977).
3. See supra note 1.
4. 363 U.S. at 568-69. The Court indicated that it is not necessarily the merit of
the particular grievance that makes the arbitration process successful and a viable
alternative to the courts, but the fact that the parties negotiated an agreement to have
all disputes handled by an arbitrator and that they can rely on this process for an
efficient and fair resolution of their grievance. "Arbitration is a stabilizing influence
only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the
agreement." Id. at 567.
5. 363 U.S. at 583-85. The Court stated that "an order to arbitrate the particu-
lar grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-83.
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Wheel & Car Corp., involved judicial review of an arbitration award.6
The Court in Enterprise Wheel refused to review the merits of the arbi-
tration award as long as the arbitrator's ruling was related to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 7 The only requirement for enfor-
cement of an order was that the arbitrator's decision draw "its es-
sence from the collective bargaining agreement."8
Although the Steelworkers Trilogy recognized arbitration as an ef-
fective and preferable alternative to litigation, the lower courts have
had a difficult time applying the "essence of the contract" standard
of review. Some of the circuit courts have shown great deference to
the fact-finding and analysis of the labor arbitrator, while others
claiming to follow the same analysis are more willing to intervene
and review the merits of an arbitration award.9 Part of the problem
is that since the formulation of the "essence" standard, the Supreme
Court has given little guidance as to what standards the lower courts
should use to determine whether the arbitrator has stayed within the
limits of the contract.' 0 In using the "essence" standard, "[c]ourts
have not hesitated to ignore arbitral awards dealing with issues such
as employment discrimination, constitutional protections, or statu-
6. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
7. Id. at 599.
8. Id. at 597. If the arbitrator's decision does not "draw its essence from the
contract" then the court may vacate it because it was not what the parties had bar-
gained for-an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. However, "A
mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to
enforce the award." Id. at 598. In addition, the Court ruled that the interpretation of
the agreement is a question for the arbitrator, and the courts have no business over-
ruling his interpretation merely because their interpretation is different from his. Id.
at 599.
9. See also Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (1987). Compare Morgan Serv., Inc. v. Local 323,
Chicago & Central States Joint Bd., 724 F.2d 1217, 1222-24 (6th Cir. 1984) (over-
turning arbitrator's award of reinstatement without back pay) and Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 243, 683 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1023 (1983)(to find an implied condition, arbitrator must first find language
of contract to be ambiguous), with Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America,
768 F.2d 180, (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986). In Ethyl, the court
noted thatjudicial review of arbitration awards is limited to determination of whether
the award "can be rationally derived from some plausible theory of the general
framework or intent of the agreement." Id. at 186 (quoting Desert Palace, Inc., v.
LocalJoint Executive Bd., 679 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)). See
also Drummond Coal Co. v. UMW District 20, 748 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11th Cir.
1984)(award upheld because "at least rationally inferable" from collective bargaining
agreement and intent of parties).
10. Kaden, supra note 2, at 267-68. "In the absence of adequate guidance, the
lower courts have had difficulty in formulating and applying standards to determine
whether an arbitrator has respected the limits of the authority granted him by the
collective bargaining agreement." Id.
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tory rights.""
It has been where the grievance is intertwined with "external"12
law that the courts have had the most difficulty in determining
whether the arbitrator's award is drawn from the essence of the con-
tract. The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue in Enterprise
Wheel by ruling that the arbitrator may look to many sources to inter-
pret the collective bargaining agreement. The Court gave its usual
admonition, however, that the award must draw its essence from the
contract. '3
The Court again addressed this issue in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. ,14 stating that an arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties."' 5
The Court further stated that the arbitrator's "task is to effectuate
the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted leg-
islation."' 16 However, the Court in Gardner-Denver addressed the is-
sue of the arbitrator's obligations when the public law is not
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. The Court
did not address the standard of review appropriate for the courts
when the agreement incorporates external law into the agreement or
when the parties specifically ask the arbitrator to rule upon the appli-
cability of external law to the grievance. 17 In addition, the ruling in
11. Heinsz, supra note 2, at 244 (footnote omitted). See also Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)(Court refused to preclude employee who was
ruled against in arbitration from pursuing claim in Federal Court under Tide VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Professional Admrs. Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819
F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987) (arbitration award allowing unilateral increase of contribu-
tions to pension and welfare fund held unenforceable as contrary to public policy).
But see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757 (1983) (court may not second guess arbitrator's interpretation of collective
bargaining agreement).
12. External Law refers generally to constitutional, statutory and case law rules.
The arbitrator may face a conflict between applying the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement or the external law when there is a conflict between the two. He
faces the problem of possibly being overturned by the courts if he ignores the exter-
nal law and rules only on the private law agreed upon between the parties in the
collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, if he attempts to reconcile the
external law with the agreement, he faces the risk that he may have overstepped his
function as an arbitrator and failed to draw his conclusions from the essence of the
contract. See generally ELKOURI & EuRouRi, supra note 2, at 373-74.
13. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
14. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
15. Id. at 53.
16. Id. at 56-57. Gardner-Denver specifically dealt with a conflict between the sen-
iority provisions in a collective bargaining agreement and the rights created by Tide
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that a ruling adverse to the
employee under the nondiscrimination clause of the agreement did not predude his
statutory right to pursue his rights under Title VII. Id. at 54.
17. See generally Heinsz, supra note 2, at 260.
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Gardner-Denver related to a situation where there was a specific statu-
tory provision that clearly applied to the employee's circumstances,
but was not considered in the collective bargaining agreement. A
more difficult situation arises, however, when there is no specific
statute which clearly applies to the grievance. It is in these cases,
where some general, poorly defined "public policy" seems to have
been violated by an award, that the courts have had the most trouble.
Some courts have resolved this issue by vacating the arbitrator's
award on the basis that it conflicts with public policy and is therefore
unenforceable.18 The rationale behind vacating the award is that al-
lowing such an award would place unreviewable power in the hands
of an arbitrator in an area that does not merely affect the private
parties, but also affects the general public.19 It is clear that when an
arbitrator's decision is contrary to a specific statute or other manifes-
tation of public law it is consequently against public policy. How-
ever, it is not equally clear that an award is contrary to "public
policy" when it is not in conflict with something so definite as a
statute.
The question then becomes, absent a positive manifestation of the
law, what standards and guidelines should a court use to determine
public policy and whether it conflicts with the arbitrator's award?
This Comment will attempt to explore this question in the context of
a recent Eighth Circuit case, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v.
Local Union 204 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 20
and in light of the criteria set out by the United States Supreme
Court, 21 in its earlier cases as well as its most recent decision in this
18. See, e.g., Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639 (6th
Cir. 1987) (wages and benefits must be collectively bargained pursuant to the Labor
Management Relations Act); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987) (award reinstating em-
ployees who had been discharged for possession of marijuana on employer's prem-
ises unenforceable as a matter of public policy); Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers
Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) (award contrary
to public policy against operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers
Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (lst Cir. 1984) ("it violates public policy to force the Postal
Service to reinstate an employee who was recently convicted of directly violating his
fiduciary duties through the embezzlement of a large sum of money"); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) (award order-
ing reinstatement of truckdriver-employee caught drinking liquor on duty violated
public policy and should not therefore be enforced).
19. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d
1280 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (award reinstating postal em-
ployee who mistakenly participated in nonunion strike held unenforceable pursuant
to federal statute prohibiting individual who participated in strike against govern-
ment from holding government position).
20. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15
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area, United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.22 In addi-
tion, this Comment will explore how the Supreme Court's criteria
are being applied by the federal courts of appeals and more specifi-
cally how they are being applied in the Eighth Circuit. Finally, this
Comment will engage in a critical analysis of the court's reasoning in
Iowa Electric 'to determine if it is actually applying the standards of the
Supreme Court and also explore possible alternatives or interpreta-
tions of the current criteria.
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Recognizing the difficulty the circuit courts have had in applying
the Trilogy standards to review of arbitration decisions, one com-
mentator has proposed that the Supreme Court is at least partly to
blame for not further clarifying these standards:
The Steelworkers opinions made an important, even historic start,
but they should have been followed after a time by further efforts
to elaborate a theory of national labor policy applicable to collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Inevitably, a Court thus engaged
would have found both need and opportunity to clarify the rea-
soned justification for the finality principle, and thus to identify a
meaningful standard for judicial review of arbitration awards. Yet,
in the past two decades, the Court has not returned to the subject.
If the mission launched by Lincoln Mills and Steelworkers has
floundered in the circuits, the Court must share some of the
blame.23
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America,24 the Supreme
Court engaged in a long awaited attempt to clarify the standards
enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy. In WR. Grace, the employer
faced possible liability for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Rather than risk this liability he chose to sign a concilia-
tion agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
22. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
23. Kaden, supra note 2, at 277 (footnote omitted). The citations of the omitted
footnote are listed below. The cases are ones which the Court has turned down for
review. See, e.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 423 U.S. 892 (1975), denying cert. to 514
F.2d 285 (2d Cir), rev'g in part 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn.); Satterwhite v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 419 U.S. 1079 (1974)(Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 496
F.2d 448 (10th Cir.); Modem Air Transport, Inc. v. Machinists Dist. No. 145, 419
U.S. 1050 (1974), denying cert. to 495 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir); United States Gypsum Co.
v. United Steel Workers, 419 U.S. 998 (1974), denying cert. to 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.);
Otis Elevator Co. v. Local 453, Int'l. Union of Electrical Workers, 373 U.S. 949
(1963), denying cert. to 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.); Local 520, ILGWU v. Glendale Mfg. Co.,
366 U.S. 950 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.
1960).
24. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
1989]
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sion (EEOC).25 The union was invited to participate in formulating
this agreement, but refused. As part of the agreement the employer
agreed to conduct layoffs according to the conciliation agreement
which conflicted with the seniority provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. As a result, the men who were laid off in viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement filed a grievance against
the employer. The employer refused to go to arbitration and an in-
junction was issued by the district court to enjoin the arbitration of
the grievance.26 This was reversed by the court of appeals and the
employer was compelled to go to arbitration.27
The arbitrator subsequently found for the union and awarded
backpay damages to the employees. 28 The employer appealed the
arbitrator's award on the grounds that it violated public policy both
because it required him to violate Title VII and also because to avoid
the backpay damages he would have been required to violate a court
injunction.29 The United States Supreme Court ruled that a court
may refuse to enforce, as with any contract, a collective bargaining
agreement that is contrary to public policy.3O The Court stated,
however, that such a public policy "must be well-defined and domi-
nant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.' "3i The Court further noted that "the question of public
policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts." 3 2
The Court agreed with the district court that obedience to judicial
orders is most certainly an important public policy.S3 However, it
also stated that enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
as interpreted by the arbitrator did not compromise that public pol-
icy.34 In effect, the Court held that the employer could not hide be-
hind the public policy exception because it had created its own
dilemma. "The Company committed itself voluntarily to two con-
flicting contractual obligations."35 The question ultimately became
one of who was to bear the burden of the company's dilemma-the
25. Id. at 759.
26. Id. at 760.
27. Id. at 762.
28. Id. at 762-64.
29. Id. at 764-66.
30. Id. at 766. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).
31. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. This statement apparently refers to a situation
in which an arbitrator decides the importance of a "public policy" in his decision and
not to situations in which the legislature has determined public policy.
32. Id. (citation omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id. The company's dilemma was that if it ignored the collective bargaining
agreement and followed the conciliation agreement, it faced liability for breach of
contract. However, if it followed the collective bargaining agreement and ignored
[Vol. 15
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company or the union? The Arbitrator, in interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement, decided that the company should bear the
losses caused by its decision to follow the erroneous district court
decision.36 The Court ruled that the company voluntarily assumed
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement to abide by
the arbitrator's interpretation of that agreement. Finally, the Court
stated, "No public policy [was] violated by holding the company to
those obligations which bar the company's attempted reallocation of
the burden."3 7
In a footnote the Court noted that compensatory damages may be
available to a plaintiff injured by a breach of contract even when spe-
cific performance of the contract would violate public policy.38 The
Court further stated that this would be particularly applicable in this
case since the union had "no responsibility for the events giving rise
to the injunction, and entered into the collective-bargaining agree-
ment ignorant of any illegality. . .. -39 This language is significant
because it makes it clear that when the employer is aware of the obli-
gations of the collective bargaining agreement, and then makes a de-
cision that puts the agreement in conflict with public policy, it will be
responsible for incurring the losses associated with the conflict.
The second important public policy noted in W.R. Grace relates to
obtaining voluntary compliance with Title VII. Congress intended
that conciliation and cooperation be used to enforce Title VII. The
Court ruled that, although the company and EEOC agreed in this
case to nullify the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provi-
sions, this agreement was not valid because it failed to include the
union in the conciliation process. 40
the district court's injunction which mandated that it lay off employees according to
the conciliation agreement, it faced both a contempt citation and Title VII liability.
36. Id. The Court noted, however, that nothing in the arbitrator's award re-
quired the company to violate the district court's order. The arbitrator's award
neither mandated layoffs nor required that they be conducted according to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. "The award simply held, retrospectively, that the em-
ployees were entitled to damages for the prior breach of the seniority provisions."
Id. at 768-69.
37. Id. at 770.
38. Id. at 769 n. 13 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365, comment
a (1981)).
39. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 769 n.13.
40. Id. at 771. Although the Court held that there was not a public policy conflict
on this issue, that holding was based on the fact that the agreement was a voluntary
one between the company and the EEOC. The opinion did not specifically discuss
the issue of mandatory compliance. However, the court stated: "Absent a judicial
determination, the Commission, not to mention the company, cannot alter the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement without the Union's consent." Id. (citing Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (Commission's power to investigate and
conciliate does not have coercive legal effect)).
1989]
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The significance of the holding in WR. Grace, to at least one com-
mentator, was that "it left no uncertainty as to the use of public pol-
icy as a gauge to determine the propriety of an arbiter's decision."41
Unfortunately, despite the restrictive language applied, many courts
have used W.R. Grace as an effective way to avoid procedural restric-
tions placed on them by the Supreme Court.42 The courts' burden
in reviewing arbitration cases is to measure the award "not only
against the norm of the collective agreement but also against notions
of public law.... ."43 However, it is also clear from the Court's ruling
that mere recitation of a public policy consideration is not enough to
sustain a public policy exception. In addition, a party cannot use the
public policy exception to avoid liability if its own actions placed it in
conflict with its obligations under the collective bargaining
agreement. 44
In United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.,45 the
Supreme Court once again attempted to clarify the criteria necessary
for judicial review of arbitration awards that pose a possible conflict
with a public policy consideration. In Misco, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit overturned an arbitrator's award because the award
violated the important public policy "against the operation of dan-
gerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.' '46
The employee in Misco was apprehended in the employer's parking
lot in the back seat of a car, from which two fellow employees had
just left, with a lighted marijuana cigarette in the front seat ashtray.
A search of the employee's car, elsewhere on the lot, revealed a
plastic scales case containing marijuana residue. However, the em-
ployer was not aware of this search until shortly before arbitration.
The employee was subsequently discharged for violating the em-
41. Heinsz, supra note 2, at 261.
42. Id. at 261-62. See also supra note 18.
43. Heinsz, supra note 2, at 263. According to Heinsz, in laying out his "Enter-
prise Plus" standard, the court is not only required to determine whether the award
complies with the Enterprise Wheel standard (whether the award "draws its essence
from the contract"), but must also measure the award against public policy consider-
ations. Heinsz sees basically three instances where public policy and the "Enterprise
Plus" standard becomes involved in the arbitration process:
(1) an arbitrator, sua sponte, utilizes public law as a basis for an award;
(2) the arbitrator renders a decision on a contractual issue which one of
the parties claims conflicts with some legal rights; or
(3) the parties, as a part of their submission agreement, request the arbi-
trator to decide a contractual issue based on public policy principles.
Id.
44. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 767.
45. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
46. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (1985),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
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ployer's rule against possession or use of drugs or alcohol on its
premises.47 The employee filed a grievance which subsequently
went to arbitration where the arbitrator ruled that there was no viola-
tion of the drug rule and reinstated the employee with full back pay
and seniority.48
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court again reaffirmed the
rule from Enterprise Wheel: the courts may play only a limited role
when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.49 The courts may
not review the merits of an award even if it rests upon factual error
or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 50 In ad-
dition, the Court stated that "where it is contemplated that the arbi-
trator will determine remedies for contract violations that he finds,
courts have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that
respect." 5 1 The Court reasoned that if intervention was allowed on
such grounds, the quick resolution of grievances under collective
bargaining agreements would be undermined.52
However, once again the Court confirmed that a court may refuse
to enforce a contract that violates law or public policy.53 The opin-
ion did reiterate, however, that a court's refusal to enforce an arbi-
trator's decision is necessarily restricted to situations where the
contractual interpretation would violate some explicit public policy
that is "well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by refer-
ence to the laws and legal precedents and not from general consider-
47. Id. at 741. The employer's plant at which the employee worked had exper-
ienced a significant drug and drinking problem especially on the night shift of which
the employee was a member. In addition, he had been reprimanded twice for
shoddy, inattentive work. The employee operated a machine called the slitter-
rewinder which cuts rolling coils of paper by means of sharp blades. Id. at 740.
48. Id. at 741. This award was overturned by the district court whose decision
was appealed by the Union. The court of appeals upheld the district court's decision.
Id. at 743.
49. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 370.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 371. The Court stated, "Normally, an arbitrator is authorized to disa-
gree with the sanction imposed for employee misconduct." Id. at 372. The opinion
then went on to note the example in Enterprise Wheel where the arbitrator reduced the
discipline from discharge to a 10-day suspension. The arbitrator "is to bring his
informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is
especially true when it comes to formulating remedies." Id. at 372 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
52. Id. at 371.
53. Id. at 373. The Court further noted:
[The] doctrine derives from the basic notion that no court will lend its aid to
one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act, and is
further justified by the observation that the public's interests in confining
the scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepre-
sented unless the judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers
whether to enforce such agreements.
1989]
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ations of supposed public interests.' "54
The Court found that public policy was not violated in this case
because the award did not create any "explicit conflict" with other
laws and legal precedents.55 In addition, the Court noted that the
court of appeals had made no attempt to review existing law and
legal precedents to ascertain that they established a "well defined
and dominant" policy against the operation of dangerous machinery
while under the influence of drugs. 56 However, the Court found
that, even if the court of appeals' formulation of public policy was
accepted, no violation of that policy had occurred.57 It was inappro-
priate for the court of appeals to draw the inference from the lighted
cigarette that the employee was actually under the influence of the
drug. Similarly, the court of appeals also made an assumption about
the employee's "amenability to discipline, a task that exceeds the au-
thority of a court asked to overturn an arbitration award." 58 Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court stated:
Had the arbitrator found that [the employee] had possessed drugs
on the property, yet imposed discipline short of discharge because
he found as a factual matter that [the employee] could be trusted
not to use them on the job, the Court of Appeals could not upset
the award because of its own view that public policy about plant
safety was threatened. 59
The Supreme Court did find, however, that it was unnecessary to
address the union's argument that a court can only refuse to enforce
an award on public policy grounds when the award itself violates a
statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive law or compels
conduct by the employer that would violate such a law.60 Although
the Court did not accept the union's argument, it also made it clear
that merely meeting the W.R. Grace requirements may not be
enough. Instead, the W.R. Grace requirements are to be construed as
a minimum threshold. "At the very least, an alleged public policy
must be properly framed under the approach set out in W.R. Grace,
and the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is
not to be enforced."61 The added requirement seems to be that
54. Id. at 373 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
55. Id. The Court stated that two points followed from their decision in W.R.
Grace: "First, a court may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when
the specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy. Second, it is
apparent that our decision in that case does not otherwise sanction a broad judicial
power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy." Id.
56. Id. at 374.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 374-75 n. 12. This understanding was reiterated by Justice Brennan in
his concurrence. Id. at 375.
61. Id. at 373-74. The standards set out by the Court in this case require that the
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there must be an "explicit conflict" between the arbitration award
and the public policy consideration.62
Thus, in Misco, in addition to finding that the court of appeals'
characterization of public policy was based simply on general consid-
erations, the Court also found that even if the arbitrator had found
that the employee had possessed drugs and then imposed a disci-
pline short of discharge, his award could not be upset by the court of
appeals. This seems to be the case because there was not necessarily
any "explicit" conflict with the public policy. Safety in the workplace
was not necessarily undermined because the employee was not dis-
charged. What makes a conflict "explicit" seems to be predicated
not on the requirement that an award be illegal, but that upholding
the award would make upholding public policy impossible.
An example of this is Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,63 in which the
Supreme Court ruled that in certain circumstances an action de novo
may be maintained despite an adverse arbitration award.6 4 The
Court reasoned that an action de novo may be commenced under the
public policy exception because denying such an action would have
made it impossible for the employee to assert his statutorily man-
dated right to bring suit under Title VII.65 Thus, in Gardner-Denver,
prohibiting review of the award and public policy did not merely
conflict, but made upholding the public policy impossible. Conse-
quently, the requirement is not that the award must be contrary to a
statute, positive law, or mandate illegal conduct. Neither is it that
the award merely be in possible conflict with a clearly defined public
policy. The award, rather, must be in "explicit conflict" with a
clearly defined public policy.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
The courts of appeals and the district courts have generally pro-
fessed to follow the standards laid out by the Supreme Court in En-
public policy be "well defined and dominant" and ascertained "by reference to laws
and legal precedents .... I d. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66
(1945)). Justice Brennan particularly supported this view in his concurrence:
I do not understand the Court, by criticizing the company's public policy
formulation, to suggest that proper framing of an alleged public policy
under the approach set out in WR. Grace would be sufficient to justify a
court's refusal to enforce an arbitration award on public policy grounds.
Rather, I understand the Court to hold that such compliance is merely a
necessary step if an award is not to be enforced.
Id. at 376.
62. Id. at 373.
63. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
64. Id. at 60. See also supra notes 14-16.
65. 415 U.S. at 54-55.
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terprise Wheel. In fact, many courts have continued to review the
merits of awards by citing the public policy exception.66 While many
of the courts have met the minimum requirement set out in W R.
Grace, i.e., that the public policy be clearly defined and not merely a
"general consideration of public policy," they have often failed to
take the next step and adequately demonstrate that these considera-
tions put the award in explicit conflict with public policy.
For instance, in United States Postal Service v. American Postal Work-
ers,6 7 the arbitrator had ordered the reinstatement, without back pay,
of a postal employee who had been convicted of embezzling postal
funds.68 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned the
award, ruling that the reinstatement of the employee violated an im-
portant public policy against the embezzlement of government
money.6 9 In addition to citing statutes that pertain to the conduct
and honesty of postal employees, the court addressed the effect that
reinstatement would have on other postal employees and on the
public in general:
Other postal employees may feel there is less reason for them to be
honest than they believed-the Union could always fix it if they
were caught. Moreover, the public trust in the Postal Service, and
in the entire federal government, could be diminished by the idea
that graft is condoned.
70
While it is not apparent that these are "clear and defined" state-
66. See, e.g., Professional Admrs. Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639,
643 (6th Cir. 1987) ("an arbitration award contrary to the public policy is unenforce-
able"); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, 815 F.2d 178, 186 (1st
Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987) (award vacated because "there is a well-
defined public policy against the use of drugs in the workplace"); Local One Amalga-
mated Lithographers of America v. Steams & Beale, Inc., 812 F.2d 763, 769 (2d Cir.
1987) (when public policy "well defined and dominant," award unenforceable);
Misco Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985)
(award vacated due to public policy against operating dangerous machinery by per-
sons under influence of drugs or alcohol); American Postal Workers Union, AFL-
CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (award vacated which required performance of an illegal act);
Local 249, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Consolidated Freightways, 469 F. Supp. 346,
349 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (award vacated when it required employees to break state motor
vehicle safety laws).
67. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
68. See id. at 823.
69. Id. at 826. The Arbitrator ruled that the Postal Service did not have just
cause for the discharge of the employee. The Arbitrator found that the employee did
not intend to keep the money evidenced by his retention of records of the money
orders and also by his seven years of employment without disciplinary problems.
The Arbitrator did rule that the Postal Service had just cause for suspending the
employee without pay and to transfer him from a window clerk position, where he
has access to money orders, to another position that did not involve dealing with
money. Id. at 823.
70. Id. at 825.
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ments of public policy, it is even less clear that the court demon-
strated an explicit conflict between the reinstatement of the
employee and the policy against embezzling government funds. The
employee was sanctioned for his infraction and was suspended with-
out pay, which according to the arbitrator, considering all the sur-
rounding circumstances and the collective bargaining agreement,
was penalty enough for the infraction.7' The court, by misapplying
the "explicit conflict" standard, altered what should have been a le-
gally binding award. In Misco the Supreme Court had stated that
"where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies
for contract violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disa-
gree with his honest judgment in that respect." 72 In American Postal
Workers, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit inappropriately
substituted its own interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the arbitrator's decision by invoking the public policy
exception.
In another case concerning the reinstatement of an employee,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co. ,73 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit overturned an arbitrator's award of rein-
statement for a truck driver who admitted having a drink within four
hours of overturning the truck he was driving. The arbitrator or-
dered reinstatement without back pay because the employer failed to
disprove the employee's assertions that a steering mechanism failure
had caused the accident.74 The court vacated the arbitrator's award
on the basis of the public policy of preventing people from drinking
and driving.75 In supporting the public policy the court stated, "In a
nation where motorists practically live on the highways, no citation
of authority is required to establish that an arbitration award order-
ing a company to reinstate an over-the-road truck driver caught
drinking liquor on duty violates public policy." 76 The court did,
however, attempt to support its position by citing case law and a stat-
ute that supported the public policy consideration. 77 However, the
71. Id. at 823. Implicit in this award was a finding that there was no just cause for
discharging the Employee.
72. 108 S. Ct. 364, 371 (1987).
73. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 123-24.
75. Id. at 125.
76. Id. at 124. The court stated, however, that "the public policy of preventing
people from drinking and driving is embodied in the case law, the applicable regula-
tions, statutory law, and pure common sense." Id. at 125.
77. Id. at 125. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Dixie Motor Coach
Corp., 128 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1942). In Dixie Motor, a bus driver employee was dis-
charged for drinking on the job. Despite the employee's claim that he was dis-
charged because of his union activities, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the reinstatement of such an employee to his former position would be contrary to
the public welfare and the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
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case law and statute did not necessarily require termination for an
infraction and the court failed to make it clear how the .arbitrator's
award explicitly violated the policy. While it is clear there is a public
policy against drinking and driving, it does not necessarily follow
that the reinstatement of an employee who admitted having a drink
would violate this policy. The court of appeals in this case correctly
followed the first part of the analysis by showing a clear and defined
public policy. However, it failed to show, as required by Misco, how
the reinstatement and the public policy came into "explicit conflict."
S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers International78 is yet another
case where a court invoked the public policy exception to an arbitra-
tion award. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
vacated an arbitrator's award which reinstated employees who had
been discharged for possession of marijuana on company prem-
ises. 79 The court vacated the award for two reasons. First, it found
that two clauses of the collective bargaining agreement worked to-
gether to give the employer complete authority to terminate in this
instance.80 The court's second point was that the award violated a
"well-defined public policy against the use of drugs in the work-
place."8 1 The court supported this conclusion by stating that the
sale and use of drugs is a serious offense under both state and fed-
eral law and that the nation has devoted itself to the eradication of
drug use.82 The court then concluded, "In particular, the work shop
is a place where such usage is abominable not only because of the
health hazard it creates, but also because it creates an unsafe atmos-
phere and is deteriorative of production, the quality of the products,
and competition."83
Clearly, there is a public policy against drug usage and possession
as defined by state and federal laws. However, this policy does not
necessarily preclude the reinstatement of an employee found to pos-
sess drugs in the workplace absent a specific contractual provision to
the contrary. Just as there are varying degrees of punishment for
drug offenses, so too may there be varying degrees of discipline for
drug use in the workplace. The parties in this case bargained for a
contractual interpretation of discipline as interpreted by the arbitra-
78. 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 180. The arbitrator found that there was not "proper cause" as re-
quired by the collective bargaining agreement and thus decided punishment less than
discharge was in order. The district court affirmed the award stating it would not
construe "cause" as equivalent to "proper cause" and declined to disturb the arbitra-
tor's decision. Id. at 181.
80. Id. at 184. This issue will not be explored although it raises questions about
the courts' role in interpreting collective bargaining agreements.
81. Id. at 186.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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tor-an interpretation which may bring into light other considera-
tions such as past performance and "amenability to discipline."84 In
this instance, the arbitrator considered the circumstances presented
to her by the two parties and decided, according to her interpreta-
tion of the contract, that there was not "proper cause" for discharge.
In contrast to the broad interpretation of the public policy excep-
tion to labor arbitration taken by many courts of appeals,8 5 a sub-
stantial number of courts have attempted to effectuate a more
narrow standard of review to determine whether there has been a
public policy violation.86 The concern of these courts has been to
construe the exception narrowly based upon the Supreme Court's
criteria of giving all possible deference to the arbitrator's judgment.
These concerns were well articulated by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which stated, "'Public policy should not be turned
into a facile method of substituting judicial for arbitral judg-
ment.' "87 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appar-
ently supports the reasoning behind such a statement. In three
recent decisions, that court narrowly construed the public policy
exception.88
In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, the
court of appeals reversed a district court judgment which overturned
the reinstatement of an employee who was alleged to have dishon-
estly handled postal transactions.89 The arbitrator was authorized to
consider all "applicable laws" in his deliberations. The employer,
however, refused to comply with the award because there were
doubts as to the correctness of the arbitrator's construction and ap-
plication of the Miranda requirements. The court of appeals held
that "[w]hen construction of the contract implicitly or directly re-
quires an application of 'external law,' i.e., statutory or decisional
law, the parties have necessarily bargained for the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the law and are bound by it."90 The court therefore
84. United Paperworkers Int'l. Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 810
F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l.,
808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Berles Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391
(9th Cir. 1986); E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Grasselli Employees Ind. Ass'n
of East Chicago, 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986); American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Amalgamated Transit Union
AFL-CIO Local Div. 1309 v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
87. Amalgamated Transit Union, 654 F.2d at 644. (quoting Dunau, Three Problems in
Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 446 (1969)).
88. See, e.g., Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d at 1239; Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 76;
American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 1.
89. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 2.
90. Id. at 6. The court also stated that "the critical point in this case.., is that it
does not matter whether the arbitrator's construction and application of Miranda was
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reversed the lower court, finding that the district court judge merely
substituted his judgement for that of the arbitrator.91
In interpreting the requirements of WR. Grace, the appellate court
determined that the exception applies only when the public policy
emanates from clear statutory or case law, " 'not from general con-
siderations of supposed public interests.' "92 The court concluded
that the public policy consideration did not emanate from statutory
or case law and was therefore based only upon general considera-
tions of public policy. Accordingly, the court found that the arbitra-
tor's award was not illegal and there was no "legal proscription
against the reinstatement of a person such as the grievant."93
In considering the public policy argument, the court declined to
take a broader view of the exception and formulate its own public
policy, but instead chose to limit itself to considerations emanating
from statutes and case law. The court saw this limitation as neces-
sary in order to comply with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Enterprise Wheel and W.R. Grace on the importance of judicial defer-
ence to arbitral decisions. The court concluded, "For us to embrace
the employer's argument here would be to run the risk of allowing
an ill-defined 'public policy' exception to swallow the rule in favor of
judicial deference to arbitration. We will not endorse any such bla-
tant disregard of the teachings of Enterprise Wheel and W.R. Grace."9 4
In, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association International,95
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reconfirmed its
correct as a 'matter of law.' " Id. See generally Heinsz, supra note 2, at 256-88 (general
discussion on whether and to what extent a labor arbitrator should apply external law
when rendering a decision under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
When the interpretation of a labor agreement implicitly or even explicitly
involves considerations of external law, it should be done by the arbitrator.
It is the arbitrator's decision that the parties have negotiated for and in-
tended when they agreed that their contractual disputes would be resolved
by final and binding arbitration rather than economic weapons or court ac-
tions. Where a company and a union agree to allow an arbitrator to deter-
mine whether a discharge is for just cause and the appropriateness of the
remedy, the arbitrator, and not the court should decide the weight to be
given to public policy considerations.
Id.
91. Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 2.
92. Id. at 8 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). This requirement does
not seem to necessarily mean that the award must be against the law, but only that
the public policy consideration must be ascertained from statutes or case law. See
generally United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 367 (1987) (the
Court declined to address the issue of whether a court may refuse to overturn an
arbitration award only when that award violates a "statute, regulation, or manifesta-
tion of positive law, or compels conduct by the employer that would violate such a
law").
93. Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 8.
94. Id. at 9.
95. 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988).
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narrow construction of the policy exception and refused to vacate an
arbitrator's award reinstating a pilot who had been discharged for
violating a twenty-four hour alcohol rule.96 In contesting the award,
Northwest claimed the award was contrary to public policy and
should not be enforced. The court recognized the possible safety
concerns but found nothing in the law preventing reformed al-
coholics from piloting. In fact, the court noted that Northwest itself
had a policy permitting this.97 Of additional importance was the fact
that the court found that the panel of arbitrators were empowered by
the contract to hear issues related to airline safety. The court stated:
"There is nothing in the parties' agreement that even suggests that a
disciplinary action related to an alleged breach of a safety rule is ex-
cluded from arbitral review." 98 This finding seems to indicate that,
in an industry that is highly concerned with public safety, unless
safety and other concerns are specifically limited by the contract they
are issues that may be considered and ruled upon by the arbitrator.
Most recently, in United States Postal Service v. National Association of
Letter Carriers99 the District of Columbia Circuit again refused to
broadly interpret the public policy exception. In this case, the court
refused to vacate an arbitration award which reinstated an employee,
for lack of just cause,' 00 who was arrested and pleaded guiltylo to
the charge of unlawful delay of the mail. The court in this case spe-
cifically rejected the First Circuit's holding in American Postal-Workers
Union,102 which had found the reinstatement of an employee con-
victed of embezzling contrary to public policy. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reiterated its view that the WR. Grace public policy
exception was "extremely narrow" and refused to set aside the
award because "[t]he Postal Service cannot identify any 'legal pro-
scription against the reinstatement of a person such as [the
Grievant].' "103
96. Id. at 78-79. The employee was a pilot with Northwest and had been em-
ployed for sixteen years with an unblemished disciplinary record. He successfully
completed a comprehensive alcohol treatment program and had not consumed alco-
hol since. In addition, he was recertified by the FAA. Id. at 79.
97. Id. at 83.
98. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original).-
99. 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 1240. The collective bargaining agreement, Article 16, Section 1 stipu-
lated that "[n]o employee may be disciplined or discharged except for 'just cause.'
Any disciplinary action taken by the Postal Service may be challenged in accordance
with the agreement's grievance arbitration procedures. The agreement further pro-
vides that discipline should be 'corrective' in nature rather than 'punitive.' " Id.
101. Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d at 1240. The employee, Hyde, was sentenced to
eighteen months probation, the principal condition being that he enroll in and suc-
cessfully complete a rehabilitation program for compulsive gambling. Id.
102. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
103. Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d at 1241.
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In contrast to the District of Columbia Circuit, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit has construed Enterprise Wheel and W.R.
Grace in a broader sense. However, the Eighth Circuit's decisions on
this matter seem at times to be in conflict. 104 In United Electrical, Ra-
dio and Machine Workers Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prod-
ucts,'0 5 the court claimed to give deference to an arbitrator's award
as long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.' 0 6 However, the court went on to say, "Judicial deference to
arbitration, however, does not grant carte blanche approval to any
decision that an arbitrator might make."' 0 7 In this case the arbitra-
tor had granted one additional week of paid vacation to employees
who were forced to take their vacation during a shutdown for inven-
tory purposes. The court ruled that the award was punitivel08 and
based on a central factual assumption that was unsupported by the
record and thus overturned the award.109 The court stated:
Although a mere error in the determination of factual issues is not
sufficient to disturb an arbitrator's award, if the arbitrator assumes
the existence of a fact that is central to the award, and an examina-
tion of the record reveals no support whatever for the arbitrator's
assumption, an award cannot stand.' 10
In overturning the award the court ignored the fact that the arbitra-
tor had construed two clauses of the collective bargaining agreement
together to arrive at his conclusion whereas the court found that one
clause controlled.111 The reasoning behind this ruling tends to sup-
port the idea that the court was not granting judicial deference to the
104. See, e.g., Daniel Constr. Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs., Lo-
cal 513, 738 F.2d 296, 300 (8th Cir. 1984); Riceland Foods, Inc. v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 2381, 737 F.2d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 1984); United Elec. Workers,
Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., 728 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1984);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53 v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d
1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); St. Louis Theatrical Co.
v. St. Louis Theatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1983); Lackawanna
Leather Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l. Union No. 271, 706 F.2d
228, 231 (8th Cir. 1983)(en banc); Vulcan-Hart Corp. v. Stove & Allied Appliance
Workers Int'l Union Local No. 110, 671 F.2d 1182, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982); Carpenter's
Dist. Council of Greater St. Louis v. Anderson, 619 F.2d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 1980).
105. 704 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
107. Id. See also Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Oper-
ators' Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 583 (5th
Cir. 1980).
108. The court found that absent willful or wanton conduct, punitive damages
should not be awarded. Additionally, the court found that there was no finding that
Litton acted willfully or wantonly and that union did not present any such proof.
Litton, 704 F.2d at 395-397.
109. Id. at 396-97.
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. See id. at 400-01 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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arbitrator's construction of the contract as required by Enterprise
Wheel.' 12
In Manhattan Coffee Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,' 13 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reiterated that the arbitrator
cannot assume existence of facts central to an award if there is no
support in the record.'14 The court did, however, go on to state that
"[]udicial review of an arbitrator's award that draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement... must be enforced even if the
court would have reached a contrary result had it considered the
matter in the first instance.""l 5 In this case the court upheld the ar-
bitrator's construction of the agreement. It is clear from a reading of
the two cases, however, that the court could impose its interpretation
of the contract on the parties merely by asserting that the arbitrator's
interpretation of the agreement misconstrued a central fact. Obvi-
ously, this type of analysis is contrary to the requirements of Enter-
prise Wheel.' 16
III. Iowa Electric Light & Power Company v. Local Union 204 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
In Iowa Electric Light & Power Company v. Local Union 204 of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 1 7 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the reinstatement of an employee at a nuclear
power plant because, according to the court, it violated public pol-
icy."t8 The employee, Schott, worked in the machine shop area of
112. 363 U.S. at 599. The Supreme Court emphasized that collective bargaining
agreement interpretation is for the arbitrator: "It is the arbitrator's construction
which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction
of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpreta-
tion of the contract is different from his." Id.
113. 743 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
114. Id. at 623.
115. Id. at 624.
116. 363 U.S. at 596. In Daniel Constr. Co. v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local 513, 738 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth Circuit considered the
public policy exception to arbitration. The court was asked to overturn an arbitration
award based on the public policy favoring the enforcement of no-strike clauses. The
court refused to vacate because the collective bargaining agreement allowed, but did
not require the arbitrator to impose damages as a sanction. The court found that the
parties left it up to the arbitrator to decide whether damages were appropriate. The
court found that there was a public policy favoring the enforcement of no-strike
clauses. However, it declined to overrule because "[p]ublic policy does not prescribe
any particular sanction for violations of no-strike clauses." Id. at 300. The court
stated, "Public policy does not empower this court to override the decision of the
arbitrator not to impose a particular sanction, where nothing in the contract requires
that sanction, and where the parties themselves have asked the arbitrator to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the proposed sanction." Id.
117. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
118. See id. at 1427.
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the employer's nuclear power plant. The machine shop is located
within the plant's secondary containment area-a buffer zone
designed to prevent the spread of any radiation that might escape
from the primary containment area at the core of the reactor."l 9 In-
terlock doors are maintained that may only be opened one at a time
to maintain the building's pressurization and ensure that any leakage
remains inside the plant.120 When one door is open the other is au-
tomatically secured. The only way to defeat this system is to have
someone outside the door pull a fuse from the interlock mecha-
nism.121 Schott was discharged because he purposely defeated the
interlock system.
Schott had a broken leg which decreased his mobility and on the
day of the incident he attempted to leave the shop early for lunch to
avoid the noon crowd, but he found the door in the machine shop
locked.122 Schott then called an engineer in the control room and
requested permission to defeat the system so he could open the
door, but was refused permission.123 Schott then told the foreman
on the other side to pull the fuse. The foreman complied and Schott
opened the door and walked through.
A. Public Policy Favoring Safety
After an investigation of the incident by the company Schott was
fired for "violating secondary containment."124 The discharge was
approved in a report by government officials at the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC).105 Schott and his union then filed a griev-
ance under the collective bargaining agreement. As stipulated by the
agreement a hearing was held before an independent arbitrator to
determine whether the company had just cause to discharge Schott.
The arbitrator ruled that his termination was "too severe" and not
justified under the "total circumstances of the case."' 2 6
The court refused to enforce the award on the basis that it violated
the "public policy of this nation concerning strict compliance with
119. Id. at 1425.
120. Id. at 1425-26.
121. Id. at 1426.
122. Apparently the interlock was properly activated because a truck was standing
in the railway truck shed doors.
123. Id.
124. Id. The foreman was also dismissed.
125. Id.
126. Id. Although the arbitrator founded that Schott's act was "deliberate, im-
proper, foolish and thoughtless" he ordered reinstatement because of his finding
that Schott was not aware that "the situation was as grave a matter as that claimed by
the company" and that "the various training sessions ... did not address the door
problem . . . specifically .. " Id.
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safety regulations at nuclear facilities."12 7 The court decided that
this policy was "well defined and dominant" 2 8 as was evidenced by
the fact that the NRC had promulgated volumes of safety rules that
govern all nuclear power plants.' 29 The court noted in a footnote
that it need not "find that the award itself is illegal before we over-
rule the arbitrator on public policy grounds."130 The court also
noted that the NRC endorsed Schott's termination. Notwithstanding
these observations, the court stated:
Our holding today should not be read as a blanket justification for
the discharge of every employee who breaches a public safety regu-
lation at a nuclear power plant. There might be circumstances
under which a violation may be excused. But in this case, Schott's
violation of the safety rule was serious.' 3 '
The court's analysis is mistaken in several respects. While there is
more than likely a national policy concerned with safety at nuclear
power plants132 it is not at all clear that this policy requires "strict
compliance" with all safety regulations. The court admitted that its
holding should not be read as justification for the discharge of every
employee who breaches a safety rule at a nuclear plant. The dis-
charge was necessary, evidently, simply because the violation was
"serious." Consequently, the public policy concern becomes a na-
tional policy requiring strict compliance with serious safety regula-
tions at nuclear facilities.
If the national policy requires strict compliance with safety regula-
tions where a violation would be "serious," the question becomes
who is to determine whether a violation is serious? Perhaps more
importantly, is this is an appropriate question for the courts? Cer-
tainly the courts do not have the expertise to determine what viola-
tions are serious and which are not. By the court's own admission
there is an entire agency to oversee the safety at nuclear power
plants.' 33 Clearly then, determining which rules are serious and
which are not is a job for the NRC. The NCR did not mandate dis-
charge for failure to "strictly comply" with the safety rule which
Schott violated, even though the NRC is the source of the "well de-
fined and dominant" public policy that the court invoked.134
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1427.
129. Id. at 1428. Any violation of any rule must be reported to the NRC; the NRC
responds by issuing enforcement penalties against the offending facility.
130. Id. at 1427 n.3.
131. Id. at 1429 (footnotes omitted).
132. Id. at 1426.
133. Id. at 1428.
134. Id. at 1427 (citations omitted).
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B. "Essence of the Contract"
The court in Iowa Electric also vacated the arbitrator's award de-
spite the United States Supreme Court's admonition in Enterprise
Wheel that a court may not review the merits of an arbitrator's award
if the decision drew its "essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement.
In Iowa Electric, the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. The parties agreed to submit the
dispute to arbitration and agreed to abide by the arbitrator's deci-
sion. 135 To quote the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
"There is nothing in the parties' agreement that even suggests that a
disciplinary action related to an alleged breach of a safety rule is ex-
cluded from arbitral review."136 The arbitrator in Iowa Electric was
empowered by the collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether the disciplinary actions taken against the employee were ap-
propriate.13 7 This type of dispute was certainly contemplated by the
parties in the formulation of the collective bargaining agreement1 38
and it was therefore inappropriate for the court to intervene and sub-
stitute its own judgement in the place of the arbitrator's. As the
Supreme Court stated in Warrior Gulf, "The ablest judge cannot be
expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon
the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed." 139
The Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel and again in Misco affirmed
the fact that an arbitrator is "authorized to disagree with the sanction
imposed for employee misconduct."140 Although the arbitrator's
decision must draw its essence from the agreement, he "is to bring
his informed judgement to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a
problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies."'4'
The parties may limit the discretion of the arbitrator in the formula-
tion of remedies. 142 In Iowa Electric, however, the parties declined to
do this.
135. Id. at 1426.
136. Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added).
137. 834 F.2d at 1426.
138. Similarly, the NRC, as a result of its extensive involvement in the planning,
construction, and operation of the power plant, undoubtedly foresaw that if a plant
operates under a collective bargaining agreement, arbitration of safety issues is likely
to arise. Id. at 1428.
139. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Gulf & Navigation Co., 367 U.S.
574, 582 (1960).
140. See United Paperworkers Int'l. Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
141. Id. at 372 (emphasis in original) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
142. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Misco also held that there must be an "ex-
plicit conflict" with other "laws and legal precedents."143 In Iowa
Electric, where there was no explicit conflict with other laws and legal
precedents, the arbitrator did not find that the collective bargaining
agreement required the employee to be discharged. The NRC, the
agency in charge of insuring safety at nuclear facilities, did not re-
quire the employee to be discharged for his infraction.144 By not
requiring automatic discharge for safety violations, the arbitrator
clearly felt that not all safety violations required discharge and that
there may be certain mitigating circumstances in which discharge is
not appropriate. Under the collective bargaining agreement, with
knowledge of the NRC safety requirements, these mitigating circum-
stances were to be determined by the arbitrator, "bringing into con-
sideration the practices of the industry and the shop." 4 5 In this
case, the arbitrator found the employee's termination was "too se-
vere" and not justified under the "total circumstances of the
case."1 4
6
As a result, the arbitrator's mitigation of the employee's discipline
did not conflict with explicit public policy as formulated by the NRC,
but instead conflicted with the Eighth Circuit's own general policy
requiring "strict compliance" with all safety regulations at nuclear
facilities. 147
Not only is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Iowa
Electric inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's criteria,
but it is also inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit's own decisions.14 8
For example, in Manhattan Coffee, the court of appeals held that judi-
cial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely limited and if the
award draws it essence from the agreement, "it must be enforced
even if the court would have reached a contrary result had it consid-
ered the matter in the first instance."'1 49
Similarly, in Daniel Construction Co. v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 512,150 in refusing to overturn an award based on a
"public policy favoring the enforcement of no strike clauses," the
court stated: "We decline to set the award aside on that ground.
Public policy does not prescribe any particular sanction for violation
143. Id. at 373 (citations omitted).
144. Iowa Electric & Power Co. v. Electrical Workers, Local 204, 834 F.2d 1424,
1426 (8th Cir. 1987). The NRC did, however, approve of the discharge. Id.
145. Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf & Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
146. 834 F.2d at 1426.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio and Machine Workers Local 1139 v. Litton Mi-
crowave Cooking Prods., 704 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1983).
149. Manhattan Coffee Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 688, 743
F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984).
150. 738 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1984).
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of no-strike clauses."151 The court further stated that "public policy
does not empower this court to override the decision of the arbitra-
tor not to impose a particular sanction, where nothing in the contract
requires that sanction, and where the parties themselves have asked
the arbitrator to determine the appropriateness of the proposed
sanction." 152
Clearly, these cases evidence a narrow interpretation of the public
policy exception to arbitration awards. In following these cases, the
court in Iowa Electric should not have required a particular sanction,
where nothing in the contract required that sanction and the parties
had asked for an arbitral determination of punishment.
In United Electric, a case where the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit did apply the public policy exception, the award was over-
turned on the basis that the Arbitrator had made an erroneous as-
sumption of a central fact. 153 The court reasoned that except for this
erroneous assumption the result would have been different and that
it was therefore justified in overturning the award. However, even if
the court's review of the facts in United Electric was justifiable, there
was no erroneous assumption of central fact in Iowa Electric. The ar-
bitrator was aware of the fact of the discharge and was empowered
by the parties to determine whether the discipline was appropriate.
His determination should not be overturned by the appellate court
based on their own formulations of general public policy requiring
"strict observance of all safety regulations at nuclear power plants."
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals failed in Iowa Electric to cor-
rectly apply the Supreme Court's criteria for vacating arbitration
awards. In the Steelworker's Trilogy the Supreme Court determined
that there was a strong policy in favor of arbitration of labor dis-
putes. The third Trilogy case, Enterprise Wheel, stands for the propo-
sition that a court should refuse to review an arbitrator's decision so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
In its most recent cases the Court has narrowed the exception even
further. In WR. Grace the Court ruled that a "public policy" must be
"well-defined and dominant," and must be ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations
of supposed public interests. Finally, the Court ruled in Misco that a
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award is restricted to situa-
tions where the contractual interpretation would create "explicit
conflict" with other laws and legal precedents.
151. Id. at 300.
152. Id.
153. United Electric, 704 F.2d at 396.
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These rulings show the Eighth Circuits' narrow interpretation of
the public policy exception. Although the clearest requirement for
allowing the public policy exception to arbitration awards may be to
require the award to violate a statute, regulation, or other manifesta-
tion of positive law before it may be overturned, the United States
Supreme Court has not required this standard. In fact, in Misco the
Court specifically choose not to address this issue.154 While the
Court may still adopt this standard, for the present the courts of ap-
peals must attempt to apply the standards set forth in the Steelworkers
Trilogy, W.R. Grace, and Misco.
It is nevertheless quite clear that the public policy exception must
be tailored very narrowly. If courts, as in Iowa Electric, are too liberal
in applying the exception and allow their own interpretations of the
contract to replace that of the arbitrator's the courts face the risk of
undermining the "federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitra-
tion," thereby allowing the exception to swallow the rule.
James P. Moran
154. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 374 n.12
(1987).
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